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POLITICAL RISK INSURANCE
I. INTRODUCTION
Political risk is one of the risks that foreign investors fear
the most when investing in Colombia. Such risk is related to
security concerns, and may be evidenced through changes in
policy, legislation, contractual relations with state entities, or
economic instability. Each one of those situations may be
viewed either as a legitimate response or as an immediate con-
sequence to political instability and the violence that has af-
fected the country for the past five decades.1 Due to the need to
cover political risks, some entities such as the Overseas Private
Investment Corporation and the Multilateral Investment Guar-
antee Agency have made risk reallocation possible through
insurance or guarantee agreements, 2 allowing investors to re-
cover at least part of their investment.
In particular, these entities' regulations provide coverage
for breach of contract when the investor is contracting with a
governmental entity.3 Under such a scenario the investor in-
sures almost the total cost of his investment, expecting to re-
cover the amounts invested in the venture in case the
government breaches its obligations. 4 In any case, the investor
must submit an enforceable arbitration award or judicial deci-
sion to the insurer, declaring that a breach by the governmental
entity has occurred in order to make a claim.
5
1 See generally Colombia, http://www.worldbank.org/co (last visited Sept. 19,
2005) (follow hyperlink entitled "Development Progress").
2 Political risk insurance is not the only way available to allocate risks. In the
particular case of international project finance structures, political risks can be
allocated via agreement to the sponsors or the host government, or by means of
credit enhancement, the creation of a reserve fund, and several contractual provi-
sions and obligations. Depending on the features of each particular case, one way
is preferred over others. See SCOTT HOFFMAN, THE LAW AND BUSINESS OF INTERNA-
TIONAL PROJECT FINANCE, 57-58 (Transnational Publishers 2d ed. 2001).
3 See generally OVERSEAS PRIVATE INVESTMENT CORP. (OPIC) PROGRAM HAND-
BOOK, http://www.opic.gov (follow "News and Publication" hyperlink to "Publica-
tion" hyperlink and then click on "OPIC Program Handbook") (last visited Sept.
27, 2005) [hereinafter OPIC HANDBOOK]; MULTILATERAL INVESTMENT GUARANTEE
AGENCY, INVESTMENT GUARANTEE GUIDE (2004), http://www.worldbank.org (follow
"Publication" hyperlink to "Document Reports" hyperlink and then run a search
for "2004 Annual Report") (last visited on Sept. 27, 2005) [hereinafter MIGA IN-
VESTMENT GUIDE].
4 See HOFFMAN, supra note 2, at 397.
5 See generally OPIC HANDBOOK; MIGA INVESTMENT GUIDE, supra note 3.
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However, would the insurer cover losses where an arbitra-
tion award is set aside or the judicial decision is annulled? In a
particular case before a court in Colombia, a judicial decision in
2002 set aside an arbitration award in favor of a foreign inves-
tor's subsidiary. 6 Such a decision impliedly revealed that judi-
cial review of an award may prevent awards from being final,
and may impede the investor from raising a claim to recover the
insured losses. In short, such a situation becomes a brand
new political risk for foreign investors taking into account that
a risk such as the one described above is not covered in the po-
litical risk market.
Foreign investment in developing economies has fallen
since the September 11th terrorist attacks, the economic crisis
in Argentina, and the corporate scandals in the United States. 7
One of the reasons attributed to the decrease in foreign invest-
ment is that the coverage of the available political risk insur-
ance seems to leave aside a significant array of circumstances
that endanger foreign investors' interest.8 In this sense, an
identification of new political risks is of the utmost importance
not only to evaluate whether the available political risk insur-
ance products are good enough to mitigate new risks, but to re-
view the effectiveness of national legislation when facing new
circumstances. After such diagnosis, measures may be taken in
order to help mobilize capital throughout the globe, and to bene-
fit developing countries in which political risks are present.
This paper presents (i) an overview of the foreign invest-
ment in Colombia, (ii) a review of the most commonly used polit-
ical risk insurances, and (iii) an analysis of the TermoRio9 case
as an accurate illustration of the new political risk identified
above. On the basis of such analysis as well as on the current
political risk coverage, two proposals in both local and interna-
tional levels are made in order to on the one hand, prevent ex-
cessive judicial involvement in cases where arbitration has been
chosen as the dispute settlement method to avoid local jurisdic-
6 See Council of State, third section. Decision of Aug. 1, 2002 by Justice Ger-
mdn Rodriguez Villamizar, http://vww.ramajudicial.gov.co.
7 See INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL RISK MANAGEMENT 
- A BRAvE NEw WORLD
19 (Theodore Moran et al. ed., 2004).
8 See id. at 87.
9 See TermoRfo S.A. E.S.P. v. Electrificadora del Atldntico S.A. E.S.P. (Arb.
2000). See also Council of State, supra note 6.
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tions, and on the other hand, to enhance the existing breach of
contract coverage for the benefit of investors and the political
risk insurance market.
II. INVESTING IN COLOMBIA
For many developing countries, the possibility of attracting
foreign capital and putting it to work is practically the exclusive
means to take advantage of state of the art technologies and
techniques, as well as better working capital. Also, it may open
a legitimate channel to introduce improvements locally at all
levels, benefiting the state through tax revenues. Nevertheless,
attracting foreign investment has historically required a big ef-
fort on behalf of legislators and governmental authorities of the
developing countries not only to the extent of implementing the
appropriate regulation, but also to change the way local govern-
ments and citizens do business in the country.
The main reasons for allowing foreign investment to enter
a country, as stated above, may vary from promoting develop-
ment and providing modernization and welfare to the country,
to the improvement of local productivity by the introduction of
qualified working capital, new technologies and new techniques
that otherwise would not be available in the country. 10 As will
be discussed later on, even when domestic foreign investment
regulations do not provide solutions for the allocation of politi-
cal risks, they bring an array of subsidies and incentives that
work well in order to attract foreign investment.
In Colombia, the General Regime for Foreign Investment in
Colombia and Colombian Investment Abroad ("RFI") is set forth
in Decree 2080 of 2000, as amended by Decrees 1844 of 2003,
and 4210 of 2004.11 Since its enactment, such a regulatory body
has provided more flexibility in the procedures and more cer-
tainty in the legal rights recognized to foreign investors in ac-
cordance with customary international law. 12
10 See RAY AUGUST, INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS LAW 244-45 (2003).
11 Decree No. 2080 of 2000 was published in Diario Oficial No. 44205 of Oct.
25, 2000 (Colom.). Decree No. 1844 of 2003 was published in Diario Oficial No.
45238 of July 4, 2004 (Colom.). Decree No. 4210 of 2004 was published in Diario
Oficial 45762 of Dec. 14, 2004 (Colom.).
12 See generally Foreign Investment in Colombia - Coinvertir. Marco Legal
(2004), http://www.coinvertir.org (last visited Sept. 19, 2005).
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The RFI defines a foreign investor as any person or legal
entity who is not a resident in Colombia and who invests off-
shore resources in the country.13 The principles that are appli-
cable to foreign investment, as stated in Decree 2080 of 2000
and Decision 291 of the Cartagena Agreement are: (i) national
treatment, or the obligation of the authorities to give foreign in-
vestors the same treatment they give to nationals, especially in
matters related to tax and ownership rights; (ii) universality,
meaning that investment is welcomed in the majority of eco-
nomic sectors except for national security and defense, and
processing and disposal of toxic or radioactive waste not pro-
duced in Colombia; (iii) general authorization to invest in any
sector of the economy, unless investment is targeted to any of
the sectors having specific regimes that require previous au-
thorization, such as oil, mining and financial sectors; and (iv)
stability, or the assurance given to the investor that even if the
conditions for reimbursement and repatriation of the currency
change by virtue of an amendment to the law, the investment
regime in force by the time the investment was made will apply
to it. 14
It is important to note that even when the RFI expressly
states that there is automatic authorization to make the invest-
ment; investors are nevertheless obliged to register their invest-
ments with the central bank, Banco de la Republica, along with
some information related to their legal nature as well as to the
destination of the investment. 15 Not complying with such regis-
tration will subject the investor to investigations and eventual
fines that could be up to 200% of the value of the investment. 16
Specific industries such as the hydrocarbons, mining, telecom-
munications, and financial services such as insurance, are
subject to a more complex regulation because of the direct inter-
vention of governmental authorities in the regulation of the ac-
tivities related to them.17
13 Decree No. 2080 of 2000, art. 4.
14 The Congress of Colombia has recently enacted the Law of Stability for For-
eign Investors, Law 963 of 2005, setting forth further protection to legal stability,
complementing the mentioned principle.
15 See BANCO DE LA REPUBLICA, CIRCULAR DCIN Dec. 16, 2004.
16 Decree No. 1746 of 1991, art. 2.
17 Law 9 of 1991, art. 15 (setting forth the framework for government in order
to regulate foreign exchange issues in Colombia).
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Before making the investment, and once all the require-
ments stated by the RFI have been met, the RFI entitles inves-
tors to a full set of rights.' 8 These rights are closely related to
the possibility for the investor to transfer and manage the pro-
ceeds of the investment (either by reinvesting them or by repa-
triating the proceeds to the place of the investor's origin or of its
preference). 19 Also, these rights allow the investor to liquidate
its business and transfer such proceeds when desired.
20
Besides the rights recognized under the RFI to foreign in-
vestors in Colombia which tend to prevent political risks related
to transfer of currency and, to some extent the risk of expropria-
tion, there are several institutions that offer certain tools to
shield investors from those risks. These tools are usually politi-
cal risk insurance or guarantees. In this sense, two of the most
relevant of those institutions are: (i) Overseas Private Invest-
ment Corporation (OPIC), from which Colombia has been re-
ceiving support since 1985, and (ii) the Multilateral Investment
Guarantee Agency (MIGA), of which Colombia has been a mem-
ber since 1994.
It is important to say that the Colombian national govern-
ment fulfilled the mandate contained in Article 226 of the Polit-
ical Constitution, which states that Colombia will "promote the
internationalization of the political, economic, social and eco-
logic relations on the basis of equity, reciprocity and conve-
nience,"21 allowing the participation of OPIC and MIGA in
transactions where foreign capital is involved. As will be ex-
plained in the following section, these two entities provide in-
surance for a particular set of circumstances that constitute
political risks, helping to attract and maintain foreign invest-
ment in Colombia.
A. Political Instability and Security Concerns as the Main
Risks Recognized by Foreign Investors in Colombia
Colombia's history has proven to be one full of political
struggles and violence. Although Colombia's democracy has
18 See Decree No. 2080 of 2000, art. 10.
19 See Decree No. 2080 of 2000, art. 10, letters a-c.
20 See id. at art. 10, letter d.
21 COLOM. CONST. art. 226.
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been one of the most stable in the entire region,22 the birth of
politically-inspired guerrilla groups in the twentieth century
and their strengthening after the 1980's has taken the lives of
thousands of nationals as well as foreigners. 23 This circum-
stance has made it nearly impossible for governmental authori-
ties and private parties to take advantage of all the resources
that the country possesses.24
Many commentators have tried to identify the sources of
violence. In a recent effort, consultants of the World Bank have
classified the possible sources as follows: (i) armed conflict; (ii)
social conflict, including poverty, inequality, political exclusion
and impunity in the judicial system; and (iii) drug trade. 25 Due
to the "multidimensional and interrelated nature of the sources
of violence in Colombia,"26 the efforts of legislators, governmen-
tal authorities, and civilians in recent decades have not been
sufficient to boost the economy and to take advantage of all the
resources and capital existing in that territory.27
Despite an increase in violence over the past few decades,
Mr. Alvaro Uribe Velez, current president of the Republic of Co-
lombia, along with other governmental entities, has been work-
ing on strengthening the democratic institutions as well as
providing the legal framework that will facilitate the resolution
of the conflicts that affect the country.28 Such effort is a means
to solve the most troubling problems that affect Colombia. By
enhancing the presence of the army throughout the national
territory and attacking the guerrillas and paramilitary groups,
the government has gained the trust of nationals and foreign-
ers. 29 However, even with governmental efforts to improve the
22 See Erika Schultz, Joint Venture Agreements: A New Mechanism for Invest-
ing in Colombia, WORLD ARB. AND MEDIATION REP., July 2001.
23 See generally Colombia, supra note 1.
24 See Enrique Luis Cuervo, Energy Law, Free Trade Agreements, and Law
Reform in Latin America. Colombia 2025: Heaven or Hell? 77 TUL. L. REV. 4, 1033-
52 (2003).
25 See MARCELO GIUGALE ET AL., COLOMBIA: THE ECONOMIC FOUNDATION 40-43
(2003).
26 Id. at 39.
27 See supra note 24.
28 See generally Departamento Nacional de Planeaci6n, http://www.dnp.gov.co
(last visited Sept. 19, 2005).
29 See Information Especiales, http://www.colombia.com/informes-especialis/
2004/balanceuribe/seguridad.asp (last visited Sept. 19, 2005).
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security situation and to provide legal tools to attract invest-
ment, the unexpected rise of risks makes it necessary to turn to
the aid of international agencies in order to cover those risks.
III. POLITICAL RISK
A simple definition of the term "political risk" is "the risk or
probability of occurrence of some political event(s) that will
change the prospects for the profitability of a given invest-
ment."30 This type of risk has been generally perceived as a
form of governmental interference in the way businesses are
conducted in a country, as well as an attitude towards the in-
vestors who carry out such businesses.3 1 However, other politi-
cal risks such as war and terrorism in which no governmental
misconduct is involved, clearly fall under this definition.
Political risks in developing countries usually arise because
many of those countries lack a well-tested legal framework to
enforce contractual obligations and to fully recognize investor's
rights to the proceeds of their investment. 32 In addition, such
countries' unstable economies and political environments usu-
ally drive governmental entities to adopt measures to somehow
stimulate economic growth. These measures include, among
others, expropriation, agricultural reforms or imposition of rein-
vestment requirements for foreign investors.33 Additionally,
governmental entities are keen to limit the sectors that are al-
lowed to receive foreign investment, to adopt policies to inflate
prices and devaluate national currencies, 34 as well as to inter-
vene in otherwise private economic relationships. Under such a
scenario, foreign investment interests would conflict with the
interests of the country, making it impossible for the country to
benefit from investment.
The sources of political risks may vary depending on their
direct cause. They can originate by the direct influence of the
30 See DAN HAENDEL, FOREIGN INVESTMENTS AND THE MANAGEMENT OF POLITI-
CAL RISK 5 (1983) (referring to the definition provided in the monograph for the
Hearings on OPIC Authorization, prepared by the Committee on Foreign Relations
and the Subcommittee on Foreign Assistance of the Senate of the US).
31 Id. at 71.
32 See THE INTERNATIONAL LAWYER'S DESKBOOK 69 (Lucinda Low et al. eds.,
2004).
33 See HAENDEL, supra note 30, at 14.
34 See id.
20051
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government and its deliberative acts, or by other politically in-
spired events over which government has little or no control
whatsoever.35 For example, the risks that are caused by delib-
erate conduct of the government can be: expropriation, limits to
currency transferability or convertibility, confiscation, change
of law, jurisdiction risks, and contract repudiation risks. 36 On
the other hand, the events over which government has minimal
interference are: war, civil strife, terrorism, rebellion, revolu-
tion, among others.3 7
Notwithstanding what the cause of the political risks may
be, one of their main characteristics is that they are unexpected
and impossible to predict by third parties such as investors. De-
spite their unpredictability, investors and governments use so-
phisticated financial tools and structured analysis in order to
identify possible risks in international transactions, thus at-
tempting to reduce the uncertainty of their occurrence. 38 Even
so, managers of corporations and decision-makers recognize po-
litical risk evaluation more as an art rather than a science, and
usually do not consider models and tools when deciding to in-
vest in a certain region. 39 This is when the option of contracting
with a political risk insurer becomes a good alternative to allo-
cate such risks.
A. Political Risk Insurance
When investing abroad, investors contract with an insurer
with one purpose in mind-to shield the investor's assets from
losses that arise from unexpected risky situations.40 Therefore,
the investor will always try to find a way to ensure that if an
identifiable risky event arises, it can be managed by one of the
parties to the transaction. 41 Political risk insurance, as a way
to allocate risks to a third party, can be contracted not only to
cover equity losses, but also losses related to loans, leases, or
35 See S. Linn Williams, Political and Other Risk Insurance: OPIC, MIGA,
EXIMBANK and Other Providers, 5 PACE INT'L L. REV. 59, 64 (1993).
36 See HOFFMAN, supra note 2, at 57-81.
37 See Low, supra note 32, at 59.
38 See HAENDEL, supra note 30, at 84.
39 See GIUGALE, supra note 25, at 63.
40 See HAENDEL, supra note 30, at 140.
41 See generally Phillip Fletcher, A Legal Guide to International Project Fi-
nance (Milbank, Tweed, Hadley & McCloy LLP)(on file with author).
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any other agreement made by the investor with other entities
including host governments, as is the case of project finance
structures .42
B. Insurable and Non-Insurable Risks
Although it has been said that "any risk is insurable if one
is prepared to pay the premiums,"43 this is not entirely true for
political risk insurance. In fact, certain situations that may be
thought of as politically-related risks are not covered by politi-
cal risk insurance: (i) currency devaluation; (ii) legitimate
change of legislation in a country (such as export - import regu-
lations, tax obligations and commercialization limitations); (iii)
interference by authorities in the grant or renewal of licenses
and permits and (iv) inflation.44 Considering that the nature of
the risks is to some extent commercial and to some other extent
political, concerns in the insurance market related to the diffi-
culty of measuring those risks and the impossibility to fix ap-
propriate premiums make those risks uninsurable.
45
Therefore, parties to agreements must foresee the occurrence of
these types of situations and allocate those risks among them.
C. Commonly Insured Political Risks
The risks faced by a foreign investor when investing in a
developing country vary significantly and take diverse forms.
46
The most commonly covered risks in the current insurance mar-
ket are: expropriation, currency inconvertibility, transfer re-
strictions, political violence, and contract repudiation.
47
1. Expropriation
Expropriation occurs when the government takes away
from the investors ownership rights over their businesses.
48
Expropriation may consist of a single event by which govern-
42 See OPIC HANDBOOK, supra note 3, at 22.
43 See GIUGALE, supra note 25, at 70.
44 See HOFFMAN, supra note 2, at 57-82.
45 See Elizabeth Kessler, Political Risk Insurance and the Overseas Private
Investment Corporation: What Happened to the Private Sector?, 13 N.Y.L. ScH. J.
INT'L & COMP. L. 203, 204 (1992).
46 See HOFFMAN, supra note 2, at 26.
47 See Williams, supra note 35, at 64-65.
48 See id. at 66.
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ment takes away a good owned by the investor without compen-
sation, but it can also consist of what has been identified as
"creeping expropriation or de facto expropriation,"49 which
means a series of events that result in a loss similar to the ex-
propriation.50 In particular, creeping expropriation may come
in the form of the manipulation of legal and administrative
rules that make the investment unprofitable.5 ' An example of
this kind of expropriation is when "the host government uses a
combination of taxes, fees and other charges and devices to in-
crease its share of the project's profits." 52 Although creeping ex-
propriation is very hard to prove, it is usually covered along
with regular expropriation by political risk insurance. 53
2. Currency Inconvertibility
This risk of currency inconvertibility can be defined as the
restriction or exchange control imposed by the governmental
authorities that impedes the conversion of local currency into
the currency consented to by the investor. 54 Such control is
usually caused by a shortage of foreign currency in the host
country, negative trade balances, or excessive foreign debt. 55
Although it is clear that there is a political element in setting
the currency exchange rates, "devaluation is not an insurable
risk, although it may be mitigated through hedging arrange-
ments and other commercial devices." 56
3. Transfer Restrictions
Transfer restrictions occur when local banks or financial in-
stitutions are not allowed to export or remit currency 57 to the
place agreed by the investor, or when the investor is unable to
49 Low, supra note 32, at 70.
50 See GIUGALE, supra note 25, at 66.
51 See Marvin Tubbs, Political Risk Insurance: The Potential Effects of Priva-
tization on Credit Availability, 16 ANN. REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 553, 557 (1997).
52 See HOFFMAN, supra note 2, at 69.
53 See Tubbs, supra note 51, at 559.
54 Id. at 557.
55 See HOFFMAN, supra note 2, at 59.
56 See Low, supra note 32, at 71.
57 See Tubbs, supra note 51, at 557.
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repatriate currency.58 This risk is usually tied in with the cur-
rency inconvertibility risk.
59
4. Political Violence
This is the least predictable of the risks. War, civil strife,
revolutions, strikes, and acts of terrorism fall into this cate-
gory.60 The loss covered under this risk is the loss of business
income or the damage caused to the physical assets.
6 1
5. Contract Repudiation
This type of risk is usually present in project financings in
the oil, energy or water sectors, in which it is usual to enter into
agreements with governmental entities or state-owned enter-
prises.62 Contract repudiation covers the risk of a government's
failure to honor its contractual obligations, and it extends to the
risk that the government "will refuse to arbitrate, obtain an
award in its favor by fraud or duress, or fail or refuse to pay an
award rendered in favor of the insured investors or lenders."63
D. Political Risk Insurance Providers
Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC) and Mul-
tilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA) are the most
important political risk insurance providers for foreign invest-
ments in Colombia.64
1. Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC)
In 1971, OPIC was established as an agency of the execu-
tive branch 65 of the United States Government. 66 It is organ-
58 See HOFFMAN, supra note 2, at 70.
59 See id. at 58.
60 See Tubbs, supra note 51, at 557.
61 See HOFFMAN, supra note 2, at 40.
62 See id. at 3.
63 See Low, supra note 32, at 72.
64 There are several other institutions that provide political risk insurance,
such as the Export-Import Bank of the United States of America, the Inter Ameri-
can Development Bank, and some private insurers, among others. See Williams,
supra note 35, at 89.
65 See HOFFMAN, supra note 2, at 403.
66 See OPIC HANDBOOK, supra note 3, at 1.
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ized as a corporation,67 directed by a board of directors
composed of eight individuals from the private sector who are
appointed by the President of the United States and confirmed
by the Senate.68 The remaining seven individuals are part of
the United States government.69 OPIC's obligations are backed
by the full faith and credit clause of the U.S. Constitution7O and
this pledge is included as a provision in every insurance
agreement. 71
With the purpose of fostering international commerce and
aiding projects that benefit the U.S. economy 72 and enactment
of foreign policy, 73 OPIC conducts "finance, insurance and rein-
surance operations on a self-sustaining basis."74 Throughout its
years of operation, OPIC has supported over U.S. $164 billion 75
of investments in countries which require social and economic
development, and which have a bilateral agreement with the
United States.76 This agency has been profitable ever since its
first year of operation. 77
When an investor decides to request insurance from OPIC,
he must apply for it before making the investment.78 The inves-
tor is also subject to eligibility requirements to contract with
OPIC.79
In order to check the eligibility of the investment, OPIC
analyzes whether: (i) the host country has a bilateral agreement
with the United States; (ii) the investor is a U.S. citizen, or a
67 See Pablo Zylberglait, OPIC Investment Insurance: The Platypus of Govern-
mental Programs and its Jurisprudence, 25 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 359, 361
(1993).
68 See OPEC website, http://www.opic.gov/staff/board.htm.
69 Id. at 361.
70 See GIUGALE, supra note 25, at 69.
71 See OPIC website, http://www.opic.gov (follow "Insurance, Lending &
Funds" hyperlink to "OPIC Political Risk Insurance Can Help Protect Your Over-
seas Investments" hyperlink and then click on "Expertise" hyperlink) (last visited
Sept. 27, 2005).
72 See Zylberglait, supra note 67, at 360.
73 See Low, supra note 32, at 223.
74 ALAN BRENNGLASS, THE OVERSEAS PRIVATE INVESTMENT CORPORATION: A
STUDY IN POLITICAL RISK 58 (1983).
75 See OPIC HANDBOOK, supra note 3, at 1.
76 See Low, supra note 32, at 211.
77 See Zylberglait, supra note 67, at 361.
78 See id. at 363.
79 See OPIC HANDBOOK, supra note 3, at 7.
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U.S. corporation, or if it is a foreign corporation, whether over
95% of its stock is beneficially owned by U.S. citizens or corpo-
rations.80 OPIC also analyzes the eligibility of each project, and
only grants the support if (i) the project is a new venture, (ii) it
is an expansion of an existing enterprise, or (iii) it is a privatiza-
tion or acquisition with developmental benefits.8 1 No minimum
investment size requirements are contemplated.8 2 Besides the
stated qualifications, OPIC has additional requirements:
projects cannot be harmful to the U.S. economy, they cannot
have a major adverse environmental impact in the host country,
and they cannot violate internationally recognized worker
rights.8 3 OPIC also demands compliance with generally recog-
nized health and labor rights.8 4 It is important to note that
OPIC has a contractual power to monitor the investor's compli-
ance with all the above obligations.8 5 Any breach of the obliga-
tions could amount to a default under the terms of the
insurance agreement signed by the investor.
8 6
When estimating political risks, OPIC bases its estimations
on past occurrences, claims, and some other factors that would
usually lead to future claims.8 7 However, OPIC has additional
sources that give it an advantage over other insurers. Since it
is a U.S. agency, OPIC has access to confidential information of
the State Department and the Central Intelligence Agency
(CIA). 8 This improves the identification of risks considerably.
As to the coverage, the main risks covered by OPIC are the
following: expropriation, currency inconvertibility and political
violence.
80 See id.
81 See id.
82 See id.
83 See id. at 1.
84 See OPIC HANDBOOK, supra note 3, at 5.
85 In practice, OPIC requires investors to report activities, answer question-
naires and to allow OPIC's representatives to visit project's sites. OPIC HAND-
BOOK, supra note 3, at 5.
86 See id.
87 See Kessler, supra note 45, at 207.
88 See Low, supra note 32, at 206.
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i. Expropriation
This risk does not only include expropriation and creeping
expropriation, but also nationalization and confiscation.89 The
expropriation will only be compensable if it deprives, directly or
indirectly, the investor from the fundamental rights derived of
the investment,90 forcing him to abandon the investment.91 It
does not cover situations provoked by the investor or foreign en-
terprise or losses due to lawful regulation and taxation on be-
half of the government.92 Governmental action, either at a
national level or at a municipal level is required, 93 but if such
intervention is not illegal under either local or international
law, it will not constitute expropriation subject to compensa-
tion.94 Due to the need of OPIC to review whether or not the
conduct of the government deprives the investor from its
fundamental rights, the actions of the government have to last
for at least a year to amount to expropriation subject to
compensation.95
Because of new needs in the insurance market,96 two addi-
tional risks can be covered: (i) expropriation of funds only, de-
fined as "unlawful host government blockage of funds intended
to be remitted as returns of the insured investment or earnings
on it," 9 7 which is tied to currency inconvertibility risk, and (ii)
"coverage against losses resulting from the unlawful breach of
specific host government obligations identified by the insured at
the outset as vital to the successful operation of the project,"98
which constitutes the so-called breach of contract coverage. It
must be noted that OPIC coverage complements the breach of
contract coverage by allowing recovery in expropriation cases
when the governmental entity involved in the investment does
89 See OPIC - Insurance Department, http://www.opic.gov/Insurance/ (last
visited Sept. 26, 2005).
90 See Zylberglait, supra note 67, at 371.
91 See id. at 372.
92 See OPIC HANDBOOK, supra note 3, at 8.
93 See Zylberglait, supra note 67, at 375. Action on behalf of government-re-lated entities is required as long as the entity is in control of the development of
the project and they act as an authorized agent.
94 See id. at 371.
95 See id.
96 See Moran, supra note 7, at 19.
97 See OPIC HANDBOOK, supra note 3, at 9.98 Such circumstances are evaluated on a case-by-case basis by the OPIC. Id.
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not comply with the dispute resolution clause included in the
contract.99
ii. Currency Inconvertibility
This risk applies to currency restrictions that prevent in-
vestors from either converting or transferring the proceeds of
the investment. As examples of currency restrictions, OPIC
provides the following: (i) new restrictive foreign exchange reg-
ulations or (ii) failure by authorities to act on an application for
hard currency. 100
It is important to point out that inconvertibility coverage
will only be applicable if the investor is not able through legal
means to convert currency, but is able to tender local currency
to OPIC. 1° 1 In the case of expropriation of funds, an illegal act
on behalf of the government is required in order to claim
such risk.10 2 OPIC insures earnings, returns of capital, princi-
pal and interest payments, and even technical assistance fees,
among others. 10 3  Currency devaluation has never been
covered. 104
iii. Political Violence
Through the coverage of this risk, OPIC compensates dam-
age or destruction of tangible property caused by politically-in-
spired violence. 1° 5 OPIC is clear in stating that "an ordinary
criminal act (such as robbery) to obtain financing for a political
group would not be included in the term 'political violence.""0 6
According to OPIC's insurance contractual provisions, the fol-
lowing situations are usually covered: declared or undeclared
war; civil war; revolution; insurrection; hostile actions by na-
tional or international forces; or civil strife that includes politi-
99 See GIUGALE, supra note 25, at 76 (either in these three cases: (i) if it fails to
participate in the procedure; (ii) if it participates but refuses to pay the judgment
or award when is unfavorable to it; or (iii) if the entity obtains an award or judg-
ment in its favor by means of fraud, corruption or coercion, or if it obtains an
award without the support of evidence on the record).
100 See OPIC HANDBOOK, supra note 3, at 8.
101 See Williams, supra note 35, at 78.
102 See Zylberglait, supra note 67, at 397.
103 See OPIC Handbook, supra note 3, at 8.
104 See Zylberglait, supra note 67, at 394.
105 See HOFFMAN, supra note 2, at 406.
106 See Zylberglait, supra note 67, at 410.
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cally motivated terrorism and sabotage.' 0 7 OPIC does not cover
actions taken in order to achieve labor or student objectives.108
OPIC pays for asset damage and business income loss
originated in the damage.109
iv. Special Insurance Programs
OPIC also offers special insurance programs for oil, gas
projects and other natural resource projects. 1 0 Under these
programs repudiation or breach of contract coverage is offered,
in case of breach of contract by the governmental entity."'
Again, a more general breach of contract coverage is recognized
under expropriation risk, making it available for ventures in
other sectors different from those included in the special insur-
ance programs, as long as they meet the requirements that
OPIC deems fit, on a case-by-case basis. 1 2 In practice, when
the investor makes the claim, and OPIC pays it, OPIC becomes
the subrogee of the claims of the investor. In such a scenario,
OPIC will be entitled to the payment of the award or judicial
decision. 113
The term of coverage will depend on what is being covered
by the insurance. In the case of equity, the term is up to 20
years. 1 4 In the case of loans, leases, or specific contracts, it will
generally be equal to the term of the particular agreement."15
As to the amount covered, OPIC insures up to 90% of the invest-
ment.1 6 If the investment is made in equity, the amount in-
sured will be equal to 270% of the initial investment (from
which 90% corresponds to the total of the investment, and the
remaining 180% to the future earnings). 1 7
107 See Zylberglait, supra note 67, at 409.
108 See id.
109 See HOFFMAN, supra note 2, at 406.
110 See OPIC HANDBOOK, supra note 3, at 13.
111 See id. at 13-14.
112 OPIC HANDBOOK, supra note 3, at 9.
113 See generally Mark Kantor, International Project Finance and Arbitration
with Public Sector Entities: When is Arbitrability a Fiction?, 24 FORDHAM INT'L L.
J. 1122, 1137 (2001) (commenting on the Patuha Power Ltd. (Bermuda) v. PT.(Persero) Perusahaan Listruik Negara, 14 MEALEY'S INT'L ARB. REP. B-1, B-23-24
(1999)).
114 OPIC HANDBOOK, supra note 3, at 22.
115 See id.
116 See id.
117 See id.
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In the case of Colombia, OPIC has participated as an in-
surer of U.S. investment in several projects including: commu-
nications; manufacturing; financial services; mining; oil and
gas; and energy. 118 According to the OPIC, more than U.S. $1.4
billion in insurance has been provided to Colombia in over 45
different projects. 119
2. Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA)
With a purpose to "enable developing countries [to] build up
their local economies, reduce poverty and improve people's lives
through promoting foreign direct investment,"120 MIGA was
created on April 12, 1988,121 as a multilateral development
agency under the auspices of the World Bank Group with over
150 member-nations. 122 Its purpose is to promote foreign direct
investment, especially in developing countries, complementing
the activities of the International Finance Corporation and the
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development,
123
and other international financial institutions. Specifically, this
agency fosters foreign investment by providing political risk in-
surance, and by supervising and advising emerging economies
to attract private investment.
124
During the last four years, MIGA has issued 711 guaran-
tees to projects around the world, 125 throughout Latin America,
Asia, Europe, Africa and the Middle East,126 in several sectors
such as the financial sector, mining sector, manufacturing, in-
frastructure, oil and gas sector and tourism. 127 In the case of
Latin America and the Caribbean, 37% of the guaranteed
projects were financial projects, 35% were made in infrastruc-
118 History of projects provided by Ellen Litton, at the Visitor's Center of the
OPIC (Washington, D.C.).
119 Informal meeting and data provided by Ms. Alison Germak, Office of Exter-
nal Affairs of OPIC, Washington, D.C.
120 MULTILATERAL INVESTMENT GUARANTEE AGENCY, ANNUAL REPORT (2004)
[hereinafter MIGA REPORT].
121 See MIGA INVESTMENT GUIDE, supra note 3.
122 See id.
123 See Convention Establishing the Multilateral Investment Guarantee
Agency art. 2, Oct. 11, 1985, 1508 U.N.T.S. 99 [hereinafter MIGA CONVENTION].
124 See MIGA INVESTMENT GUIDE, supra note 3.
125 See MIGA REPORT, supra note 120.
126 See AKIRA IIDA, MIGA: THE STANDARD SETTER 37 (World Bank Publication
1995).
127 See id. at 36
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ture, 12% in oil and gas, 11% in tourism and services and 5% in
agribusiness and manufacturing.128
Similarly to OPIC, MIGA reviews applications delivered by
prospective investors with the purpose of verifying whether the
investment and the investor are eligible for insurance. 129 In
general, MIGA's requirements are more flexible than those pro-
vided by OPIC. MIGA, as a result of being independent from
any particular government, provides insurance for projects in
countries where the United States has been reluctant to offer
its support for legal or policy reasons. 130 However, in all cases,
its participation as an insurer is limited to projects that en-
courage development in emerging economies,'13 a fact that
might be seen as a disadvantage.
For the investor to be eligible to participate, MIGA requires
him to be: (i) a national from a country member, different from
the one that will be benefited from the investment; (ii) if it is a
corporation, it must be incorporated and have its place of busi-
ness in a member country, or be controlled by nationals of mem-
ber countries; and (iii) if the entity is owned by a state, it will be
eligible for a guarantee in case such entity is acting with a com-
mercial purpose. 132 It is also permitted for a national investor
to invest proceeds obtained abroad and be eligible for the insur-
ance offered by MIGA.133
Regarding the investment, the following requirements have
to be met:
(a) The investment has to be made through equity, shareholder
loans, loan guarantees of the shareholders, and unrelated
third-party loans as long as the applicant for the guarantee is
a shareholder. Other permitted forms of investment are con-
tractual agreements of which the term is more than 3 years
and which earnings depend on the profitability of the
project.134
128 MIGA REPORT, supra note 120.
129 See MIGA INVESTMENT GUIDE, supra note 3.
130 See Tubbs, supra note 51, at 567.
131 See id.
132 See MIGA CONVENTION, supra note 123, art. 13.
133 See GIUGALE, supra note 25, at 83.
134 See MIGA CONVENTION, supra note 123, art. 12.
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(b) The eligible investment has to be targeted to a developing
member country. 135
(c) The investment has to be targeted to: (i) a new project; (ii) the
expansion or modernization of an existing project; or to (iii)
acquisitions that involve privatization of entities owned by the
state. 136 The investment must also contribute to fulfill devel-
oping objectives of the host country, and has to be financially,
economically and environmentally sound.137 Also, the project
must comply with the laws of the host country. 138
It is important to point out that before MIGA insurance is
issued, the host country must give its approval. 139 Usually,
MIGA obtains such approval by itself, increasing "the likelihood
that the host government will work with MIGA in a way that
reduces claim exposure."'140 This feature is considered to be an
advantage over other insurance providers because the direct in-
volvement of the agency assures host country cooperation.
Article 22 of the treaty for the constitution of MIGA states
that the guarantees issued in favor of an investor will not
exceed 150% of the total subscribed capital on behalf of the
investor. 14' MIGA is free to negotiate contractual provisions
providing lower amount limits. The coverage of the guarantee
issued by MIGA is very similar to the one offered by OPIC.
However, a significant difference is that the risk of breach of
contract is considered a general risk and can be contracted for
any type of investment in which a governmental entity inter-
venes, and is not limited to energy and oil and gas projects, nor
depends on a case-by-case analysis as provided in OPIC's regu-
lations. This will be explained in more detail later.
The next subsections discuss the risks covered by MIGA.
135 See id. art. 14.
136 See MIGA INVESTMENT GUIDE, supra note 3.
137 See id.
138 See GIUGALE, supra note 25, at 83.
139 See MIGA CONVENTION, supra note 123, art. 15
140 See HOFFMAN, supra note 2, at 399.
141 See MIGA Convention, supra note 123, art. 22.
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i. Currency Inconvertibility and Transfer
Restrictions142
It covers the losses faced by the investor for its inability to
convert local currency into the consented currency and impossi-
bility of transferring it abroad, due to lack of foreign exchange
or adverse change in laws and regulations. 143 It applies to
capital, principal amounts, interest, profits, royalties or other
remittances. It also covers the delays in converting currency at-
tributable to the local government.144 Once the investor deliv-
ers the currency to MIGA, it will pay the compensation in the
consented currency.
ii. Expropriation and Similar Measures 45
The coverage of these risks protects investors from losses
derived from any administrative legal action on behalf of the
government, taken with the purpose of depriving investors from
all or part of their ownership rights over the investment. 146
Confiscation, nationalization and creeping expropriation are
covered, as well as partial expropriation over tangible assets
and funds. 147 Similarly to OPIC, MIGA will not compensate
when government has exercised legitimate authority over the
assets.148
iii. War and Civil Disturbance49
MIGA covers the loss, damage, disappearance or destruc-
tion of tangible assets caused by "politically motivated acts of
war or civil disturbance in the host country, including revolu-
tion, insurrection, coup d'6tats, sabotage, and terrorism." 50 It
also covers interruption, for a certain period of time provided in
the contract, of activities due to the aforementioned circum-
stances, and which could amount to a total loss.' 51
142 Id. at art. 11(a)(ii).
143 See HOFFMAN, supra note 2, at 399.
144 See MIGA INVESTMENT GUIDE, supra note 3.
145 MIGA CONVENTION, supra note 123, art. 11(a)(ii).
146 See HOFFMAN, supra note 2, at 399.
147 See MIGA INVESTMENT GUIDE, supra note 3.
148 See HOFFMAN, supra note 2, at 399.
149 MIGA CONVENTION, supra note 123, art. 11(a)(iv).
150 MIGA INVESTMENT GUIDE, supra note 3.
151 See id.
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iv. Breach of Contract152
MIGA covers the breach or repudiation of the contract on
behalf of the government that is party to it.153 The investor
must start dispute resolution procedures, and obtain an award
in its favor.15 4 In case the investor's counterparty is not willing
to pay the award, or the procedure is not following its due
course because of the conduct of the governmental entity, MIGA
will pay the compensation to the investor. MIGA is also enti-
tled to pay a provisional compensation when the final decision
in the procedure is pending. 155
As to the extent of the risks covered, it should be noted that
new risks can be added to the ones stated above on an ad hoc
basis. 15 6 Then, in case both the investor and the host country so
require, the vote of the majority of MIGA's board of directors 157
may enhance the coverage.
MIGA's guarantees are usually issued for a period of 15 to
20 years, depending on the nature of the particular project or
venture,158 and for a maximum amount of U.S. $200 million per
project. 159 The percentage of the guarantee will cover up to 90%
of the equity investment plus up to 45% of earnings. 160 In the
case of loans, MIGA guarantees up to 95% of the total amount,
plus up to 135% of the loan to cover accrued interest. 61
According to the annual reports of MIGA, several projects
have been insured in Colombia.1 62 During the years of 1997,
1999 and 2001, projects in the mining, financial and energy sec-
tors have been insured against risks of expropriation, transfer
restrictions and war and civil disturbances for amounts from
152 MIGA CONVENTION, supra note 123, art. 11(a)(iii).
153 See HOFFMAN, supra note 2, at 400.
154 See MIGA INVESTMENT GUIDE, supra note 3.
155 See id.
156 See Williams, supra note 35, at 86.
157 See GIUGALE, supra note 25, at 85.
158 See MIGA INVESTMENT GUIDE, supra note 3.
159 See id.
160 See id.
161 See id.
162 See MIGA Annual Reports, http://www.worldbank.org (follow "Publication"
hyperlink to "Document Reports" hyperlink and then run a search for "Annual Re-
port") (last visited on Sept. 27, 2005)
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U.S. $35 million to U.S. $100 million. 163 MIGA has also contrib-
uted the marketability of the country, through the assistance to
Corporacion Invertir en Colombia - Coinvertir, the governmen-
tal entity in charge of the promotion of foreign investment in
Colombia.164
E. Breach of Contract Coverage as a Way to Mitigate Risks
When Governmental Authorities Overreach their Powers
Both OPIC and MIGA provide political risk coverage in
case there is a breach of contract by the contracting governmen-
tal authority. In short, and using infrastructure projects, com-
mentators have said that the "investor must first seek recourse
against the host government through the dispute resolution
mechanism applicable to the project agreement, and the govern-
ment must fail to honor a favorable award or judgment."' 65 In
other words, an investor will be able to make a claim as long as
he exhausts available remedies, obtains a favorable award or
judicial decision evidencing such breach of contract, and tries to
enforce it without success. 166
A further explanation must be made with respect to the
coverage of breach of contract. Despite its name, this type of
coverage refers only to the "wrongful failure by the host govern-
ment party to pay an award following an agreed-upon arbitra-
tion or other dispute resolution procedure." 167 In this sense, it
excludes the protection against a simple failure of the host gov-
ernment to comply with its obligations under an agreement
before exhausting the available remedies that, in the end, will
determine what is due to the investor. 168
On the basis of the above, the following steps must be taken
in order for an investor to make a claim under the breach of
contract coverage:' 69
163 See WORLD BANK, ANNUAL REPORTS (1997-2004), http://www.miga.org (last
visited Sept. 27, 2005).
164 See MIGA REPORT, supra note 120; MIGA ANNuAL REPORT (2003).
165 Moran, supra note 7, at 43.
166 See id. at 42.
167 Moran, supra note 7, at 47.
168 Id. at 49-52.
169 See id. at 50.
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(a) Resort to arbitration, if the disputed agreement contains an
arbitration clause. Otherwise, go to court.
(b) Obtain a final and binding award or decision, not subject to
appeal.
(c) Seek enforcement of the award or decision.
(d) Face the impossibility of enforcement due to the failure of the
host government to pay within a period of 90 to 180 days, de-
pending on the insurer.
The breach of contract coverage provided by insurers such
as OPIC and MIGA is typically focused on the procedural risks
that may be faced by an investor when the host government is
not willing to either honor its obligations derived from the dis-
pute resolution mechanism, or to enforce the award or judicial
decision when it is not favorable to the host government.
170
Such coverage seems to be consistent with a narrow interpreta-
tion of the international law principle of denial of justice, appli-
cable to foreigners when facing procedures in sovereign
states. 171 The principle of denial of justice is defined as "a de-
nial, unwarranted delay or obstruction of access to courts, gross
deficiency in the administration of justice or remedial justice,
failure to provide those guarantees which are generally consid-
ered indispensable to the proper administration of justice, or a
manifestly unjust judgment. 172
On the basis of the stated definition, the principle of denial
of justice has been used in three different senses, depending on
the interpretation given to the principle. In a broad sense, it
"seems to embrace the whole field of State responsibility, and
has been applied to all types of wrongful conduct on the part of
the State toward aliens,"173 which means to include acts by the
executive, legislative, or judicial branches of the state. In a nar-
row sense, it is "limited to refusal of a state to grant an alien
access to its courts or a failure of a court to pronounce a judg-
170 See id.
171 See Carlos Garcia, All the Other Dirty Little Secrets: Investment Treaties,
Latin America, and the Necessary Evil of the Investor-State Arbitration, 16 FLA. J.
INT'L L. 301, 331 (2004) (citing IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW 529-532 (5th ed. 1998)).
172 See Garcia, supra note 171.
173 Rene Lettow Lerner, International Pressure to Harmonize: The U.S. Civil
System in an Era of Global Trade, 2001 BYU L. REV. 229, 250 (2001) (citing F.V.
GARCdA-AMADOR ET AL., RECENT CODIFICATION OF THE LAW OF STATE RESPONSIBIL-
ITY FOR INJURIES TO ALIENS 180 (1974)).
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ment." 174 In an intermediate sense the phrase, denial of justice
"is employed in connection with the improper administration of
civil and criminal justice as regards an alien, including denial of
access to courts, inadequate procedures, and unjust deci-
sions. " 175 Under the intermediate sense, denial of justice may
occur on a procedural level as well as on a substantive level;
hence it requires a thorough review of the decision. In any case,
"a decision does not constitute a denial of justice unless it is so
obviously wrong and unjust that no court honestly has arrived
at such conclusion."1 76 Under this interpretation, a denial of
justice case is hard to prove, and determining whether there is a
denial of justice will depend on the decision-maker's opinion.
The narrow interpretation explained above seems to be
closest to the coverage of OPIC and MIGA, considering that
both require the investor to initiate a procedure to enforce its
rights under an agreement and to demand that there be impos-
sibility to enforce a final decision before the competent courts.
In the same sense as with the breach of contract coverage, the
narrow interpretation of the denial of justice principle only rec-
ognizes procedural impediments to enforce the final decision,
and does not cover cases in which the substance of the decision
is so "wrong and unjust that the court had to be corrupt or
biased." 77
With regard to the limited scope of the breach of contract
coverage, it seems that the underlying reason for excluding
mere breach of obligations on behalf of the host country from
such coverage is rather simple and cost-effective from an in-
surer's point of view. Insurers, either private or public, prefer
to have a final decision made by a court or an arbitration tribu-
nal as to the breach of contract favoring the investor, rather
than make such decision themselves,178 in my opinion, "out-
sourcing" such decision to the competent authorities. There-
fore, if the award is set aside, or if the judicial decision is
annulled, a claim cannot be paid by either OPIC or MIGA be-
cause there would not be a declared breach of contract.
174 Id. at 250.
175 Id.
176 Lerner, supra note 173, at 261.
177 HOFFMAN, supra note 2, at 332.
178 See Moran, supra note 7, at 52.
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In the following section, the analysis of a case brought
before the courts of Colombia illustrates the political risk that
lies in the intervention of domestic courts when reviewing and
setting aside an award on the basis of broad legal powers, and
reveals a doubtful application of the arbitration rules available
in the seat of the arbitration.
IV. COLOMBIAN PERSPECTIVE: TERMORfO CASE
During the 1990s, due to the need to restructure the public
utilities sector, to avoid losses and ensure efficiency in the ren-
dering of such services, the Colombian government started a
long-term plan through the privatization of several public enti-
ties.17 9 This plan included the possibility for private investors
to participate in the water, energy and telecommunications
markets under the supervision of the governmental entities.
180
Under such a perspective, the Colombian government would
maintain its capacity as planner and regulator of the public
utilities sector, but would permit private entities to provide the
services contributing to the efficiency of the service.' 81
Under such a scenario, the TermoRio case involved two
companies, one state-owned, and the other a subsidiary of a for-
eign company.18 2 These two companies entered into a power
purchase agreement (PPA).18 3 After six months of the execu-
tion of the PPA, because of a decision of the Colombian national
government to liquidate the state-owned entity, a breach under
the PPA arose.18 4 Therefore, an arbitration tribunal was ap-
pointed in order to solve the dispute in accordance with the pro-
visions of the PPA.18 5
After a long and controversial arbitration procedure, an
award was rendered by the arbitration tribunal. Under such
179 See National Council of Economic and Social Policy, Docs. 2932 (Apr. 12,
1997) and 2950 (Sept. 24 1997).
180 See id.
181 See id.
182 See Portafolio.com, http://www.portafolio.com.co/porta-donoonline/10
anios/ARTICULO-WEB-NOTAINTERIORPORTA-1246171.html (last visited
Sept. 28, 2005).
183 See generally TermoRfo S.A. E.S.P. v. Electrificadora del Atldntico S.A.
E.S.P. (Arb. 2000).
184 See TermoRio S.A. E.S.P.
185 See id.
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award, the state-owned entity was to pay its counterparty ap-
proximately U.S. $60 million for breaching its obligations.186
However, a judicial action was brought before the Council of
State, the highest judicial authority with the power to review
awards involving state-owned entities.18 7 The judicial decision
annulled the arbitration award on grounds different from those
provided under national arbitration regulations and contra-
dicting parties' consent.' 88
A. Parties to the Agreement
According to the facts stated in the arbitration award is-
sued by the arbitration tribunal in the TermoRio case, dated
December 21, 2000, one of the parties to the procedure was
TermoRio S.A. E.S.P. ("TermoRfio"), a corporation incorporated
under the laws of Colombia whose majority shareholder was
Sithe Energies, a U.S. company.'8 9 TermoRfo was the claimant
in the procedure and the supplier under the PPA.190 Electranta
S.A. E.S.P. (Electranta), a state-owned entity incorporated
under the laws of Colombia, 191 was the respondent and buyer
under the PPA.192
B. Terms of the PPA
The agreement provided that TermoRio would supply 266
megawatts of energy to Electranta for a term of 20 years, by
virtue of a public bid awarded to TermoRfo among seven other
participants.19 3 The agreement would be subject to the laws of
Colombia, and it included an arbitration clause which was
amended as follows:
Any controversy or difference that may arise within the parties
and that is related to execution, interpretation, performance or
termination of this agreement shall be resolved by means of any
186 See id.
187 See id.
188 See Council of State, supra note 6.
189 See Portafolio.com, www.portafolio.com.co/porta-dono online/10anios/AR-
TICULO-WEB-NOTAINTERIORPORTA-1246171.html (last visited Sept. 28,
2005).
190 See TermoRio S.A. E.S.P.
191 TermoRio S.A. E.S.P.
192 Id.
193 Id.
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of the alternative dispute resolution mechanisms, amicable com-
positeur, or transaction within a term of no more than 3 weeks. If
no agreement is reached by the parties, the dispute shall be set-
tled by an arbitration tribunal under the ICC Rules. The tribunal
will be composed by 3 arbitrators who will be appointed by the
ICC. The place of arbitration will be the city of Barranquilla, Co-
lombia. The award, which will be binding, shall be issued within
3 months. 194
It is important to point out that by the time the agreement
was executed by the parties, 195 the applicable rules for arbitra-
tion procedures in Colombia were contained in Law 315 of 1996
that regulates international arbitration, still in force today,
Law 23 of 1991 and Decree 2279 of 1989, which set forth the
general regime of mechanisms for alternative dispute resolu-
tion.196 These regulations recognized the enforceability of the
arbitration award rendered by an arbitration tribunal when the
parties agreed to bring their disputes before it, and stated that
such agreement derogates the right of the parties to go to court
to make claims that were submitted to arbitration.
1 97
Such regulation, though, was not perfectly clear regarding
the possibility for the parties to choose their arbitration rules.
Only the international arbitration law expressly allowed, and
still does allow, parties to choose their procedural rules. How-
ever, nothing is said regarding the domestic arbitration proce-
dures.1 9 8 Hence, the issue of whether the parties were or were
not in an international arbitration scenario plays a very rele-
vant role along the procedure of the TermoRio case, and is re-
viewed on several occasions. Despite this issue, the parties
consented, as stated above.
Within six months of signing the PPA, governmental au-
thorities started to implement the privatization plan in order to
improve the efficiency and competitiveness of the public utili-
194 Author's translation.
195 See TermoRfo S.A. E.S.P. (including the date in which an amendment to
the arbitration clause was made, during Jan., 1998).
196 See Law 315, Diario Oficial 42878 (Sept. 1996) (Colom.); Decree No. 2279,
Diario Oficial 39012 (Oct. 1989) (Colom.), http://alca-ftaa.iadb.org/eng/invest/col-1.
htm; Law 23, Diario Oficial 39752 (Mar. 1991)(Colom.).
197 See Decree No. 2279 art. 2 (1989). See also NIGEL BLACKABY ET AL., INTER-
NATIONAL ARBITRATION IN LATIN AMERICA 115 (2002).
198 See Decree No. 2279 of 1989. See also Law 23 of 1990.
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ties sector. 199 Under this plan, Electranta's majority share-
holder, Corelca S.A. E.S.P.,200 was going to be capitalized and
Electranta was to be liquidated.201 The remaining assets were
to be transferred to a newly created company called Electri-
caribe S.A. E.S.P. (Electricaribe).202
In view of this situation, TermoRfo's representatives pro-
posed amendments to the PPA, foreseeing an eventual default
of the PPA after the liquidation of Electranta, and, aware that
under the terms of such agreement their consent had to be re-
quested in case of a sale of assets.20 3 The proposal included an
authorization for the registration of a new agreement in the
same terms of the PPA, according to requirements of law, but
under which Electricaribe would take the place of Electranta
and become the buyer.204 Electranta agreed to such amend-
ments and promised to register them before the competent au-
thority to comply with the applicable law. 20 5 Shortly after,
witnessing the liquidation of Electranta and the transfer of all
of its assets before the registration of the new agreement,
TermoRfo decided to bring a claim to an arbitration tribunal for
breach of the PPA in 1999.206
C. Arbitration Procedure
Pursuant to the arbitration clause agreed to by the parties
as well as under the ICC rules,20 7 three Colombian arbitrators
were appointed, and proceedings started in the city of Barran-
quilla.208 Along with the response to the claims, Electranta
submitted objections as to the competence of the arbitration tri-
bunal to decide the matter, due to: (i) the invalidity of the arbi-
tration clause for not complying with the applicable rules; and(ii) for not being an international arbitration, because the par-
199 See National Council of Economic and Social Policy, supra note 152.
200 Corelca S.A. E.S.P. is a state-owned entity in charge of the generation and
commercialization of energy on the Caribbean coast of Colombia, http://www.
corelca.gov.com.
201 See TermoRio S.A. E.S.P.
202 See TermoRio S.A. E.S.P.
203 See id.
204 See id.
205 See id.
206 See id.
207 See id.
20s See id.
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ties did not expressly state so in the arbitration clause. 20 9 Addi-
tionally, a request to stay arbitration was filed by Electranta
due to the existence of two different civil and criminal proce-
dures related to the case.210 By means of an interim award, and
pursuant to the ICC rules,211 the arbitration tribunal reviewed
and confirmed its competence to hear the matter.
212
On the basis of the Colombian arbitration regime,213 the ar-
bitration tribunal decided to go along with the arbitration pro-
cedure considering that the will of the parties to arbitrate
evidenced their preference for international arbitration over ju-
dicial remedies. 2
14
Although the arbitration tribunal did not spend much time
on the issue of its jurisdiction, and especially on the issue of the
internationality of the arbitration, it was clear that its decision
favored the consent of the parties to arbitrate.
21 5
It is important to note at this point that from a reading of
the Colombian international arbitration regime, 21 6 such regime
can be applied as long as the parties agree that the arbitration
has an international character, and at least one of the following
criteria are met:21
7
(a) That the parties' main place of business was located in differ-
ent states, when signing the arbitration clause.
(b) That the place of execution of the main agreement is different
from the place of residence (or main place of business) of the
parties.
(c) That the place of arbitration is different from the place where
the parties have their residence.
218
209 See TermoRio S.A. E.S.P.
210 See id.
211 See id.
212 The Tribunal applied the regulation in force by that moment in Colombia,
including Decree No. 1818 of 1998, which was enacted after the execution of the
PPA.
213 Decree No. 2279 of 1989, art. 2. See also COLOM. CODE OF CIV. P., art. 97.
214 See TermoRio S.A. E.S.P.
215 See id.
216 See Law 315 Diario oficial 42878 art. 1 (Sept. 1996) (Colom.).
217 See id.
218 The Constitutional Court of Colombia extended the application of this re-
quirement, for the case in which one of the parties is a national from a different
state than that in which it is residing. Hence, a nationality test must also be con-
ducted. Decision C-347 of 1997.
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(d) That the dispute involves the interest of more than one state
and the parties have expressly so agreed.
(e) That the arbitral decision affects directly and unmistakably
the interest of international trade.
Another important feature of the International Arbitration
Law is the possibility to choose procedural rules, such as the
ICC or the UNCITRAL rules, thus avoiding the application of
the domestic civil procedure legislation to the arbitration.219 In
the TermoRio case, both parties consented to apply ICC rules
and the arbitration tribunal followed those rules closely from
the beginning of the procedure, according to the parties'
consent. 2
2 0
Once the arbitral tribunal determined its jurisdiction, it
moved on with the procedure, seemingly taking for granted that
the arbitration clause was valid.221 It evidenced the parties'
will to opt for an international arbitration, and, since foreign
investment was involved in the transaction between TermoRfo
and Electranta, such transaction affected international com-
merce interests.222
In this regard, commentators have reviewed how Article 1
of Law 315 should be interpreted in order to fulfill the require-
ment of internationality in the arbitration. It has been said
that:
At first sight [Article 11 gives the impression that it requires the
parties to 'stipulate' or express their will, that their arbitration be
international. However, a close reading of Law 315 and its legis-
lative history leads to one conclusion: what was meant was that
there be a valid arbitration agreement; internationality was to be
solely a matter of specific criteria on internationality set forth in
Article 1.223
In other words, following a strict civil law approach, a re-
view of the legislative history prior to the enactment of Law 315
illustrates that legislators' intention was that the validity of the
219 See Law 315 of 1996, art. 2.
220 After 1998 with the enactment of Decree No. 1818, it is still not clear
whether the parties can opt for procedural rules of independent institutions to
avoid domestic regulation. See Decree No. 1818 of 1998, art. 116.
221 See TermoRio S.A. E.S.P.
222 See id.
223 BLAcKABY, supra note 197, at 131.
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arbitration agreement and the consent of the parties were
enough evidence of the parties' desire to opt for an international
arbitration. Under the mentioned interpretation, the arbitra-
tors' conclusion as to the validity of the arbitration agreement
and to the internationality of the dispute was made in accor-
dance with the law.
On December 21, 2000, the arbitration tribunal issued an
award, in which the following issues were discussed:
224
1. Existence and Validity of the PPA and its
Amendments
Electranta objected to the validity and existence of the PPA
and its amendments, on the following grounds:225 (1) the PPA
was null and void because it contravened rules issued by the
Regulatory Commission for Energy and Gas 226 (CREG); and (2)
there was a lack of authority on behalf of the representative of
Electranta who signed the agreements, since he was the legal
representative of Electranta while acting as one of the directors
of TermoRo. 227
With regard to the first ground, the arbitration tribunal
stated that the PPA did not violate any of the rules and regula-
tions applicable thereto.228 In particular, it stated that even
when the CREG requested some clarifications once the parties
signed the agreement, none of those clarifications were impera-
tive rules, and the violation of such clarification could not affect
the existence and validity of the agreement.229 The arbitration
tribunal added that since the parties signed the PPA, such con-
tract validly existed under the applicable laws. 230 Whether the
registration was or was not made did not impede the PPA from
being valid, and it did not affect the provisions and obligations
contained therein.
224 See TermoRio S.A. E.S.P.
225 See id.
226 CREG, a regulatory entity created by means of article 69 of Law 142 of
1994 with the purpose of setting the rules of the public utilities sector, maintaining
levels of competence and fulfilling the needs of the consumers.
227 Electranta was a minority shareholder in TermoRfo.
228 See TermoRio S.A. E.S.P.
229 Id.
230 Id.
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In relation to the second ground, the arbitration tribunal
found evidence to justify that the representative of Electranta
who signed the PPA and its amendments had full authority to
do so under the certificate of incorporation of Electranta and its
statutes. 231 Considering that the person who signed the agree-
ment acted as representative of Electranta while also acting as
a director in TermoRfo, and since such circumstance was not
recognized by the law as a ground to challenge such person's
competence to perform as either of them, the arbitration tribu-
nal dismissed that particular claim.232
Further reviewing the last ground, the arbitration tribunal
stated that the grounds to challenge competence of a person
must be expressly stated in the law, citing the Constitution of
the Republic of Colombia and the law applicable to individuals
who serve as officers of state-owned entities.233 In such sense,
additional grounds cannot be created for each case depending
on the needs of each claimant.234 In addition to that, the arbi-
tration tribunal also considered that if the law provides the pos-
sibility for the entities of the energy sector to constitute
alliances and to collaborate in the same ventures, it would not
make any sense to prohibit the participation of one entity in the
other's business, even when both of the entities have common
directors or officers.235
2. Force Majeure
The respondent stated that it was impossible to perform his
obligations under the contract due to the intervention of the Co-
lombian government, as well as to the consequent liquidation
and transfer of its assets to a newly created company. 236 In the
opinion of Electranta, such event was outside of its control.
Furthermore, the decision to liquidate the company was due to
a national governmental policy. Therefore, it constituted a force
majeure event.
In response to this ground, the arbitration tribunal stated
that the decision of liquidating a state-owned company such as
231 See id.
232 See id.
233 See id.
234 See id.
235 See id.
236 See TermoRio S.A. E.S.P.
[Vol. 17:301
34http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol17/iss2/7
POLITICAL RISK INSURANCE
Electranta was not due solely to the will of the government. 237
The arbitration tribunal stated that in order to liquidate a
state-owned company, there had to be grounds recognized by
law to proceed that way. 238 The grounds under which the gov-
ernment was making such decision were, among others, mis-
management of the state-owned company and eminent risk of
insolvency, which under either situation should not be consid-
ered as force majeure events. Even when the liquidation of
Electranta was made pursuant to the government's plan to im-
prove the efficiency in the sector, the decision of the government
to intervene in the activities of Electranta was justified by the
legal grounds stated above.
239
In such sense, the arbitration tribunal stated that Elec-
tranta could not argue that its liquidation was an unforeseeable
or an unavoidable event, as it was required under Colombian
legislation to prove force majeure because it was public knowl-
edge that the company had become unsustainable. 240 This ar-
gument was also applied by the arbitration tribunal to the issue
of the transference of Electranta's assets, which, according to
the arbitration tribunal, was, in a general sense, the immediate
consequence of the liquidation of a company that was not viable
and that was causing losses to the national treasury.241 In ad-
dition to the above, the fact that the assets were going to be
transferred constituted a breach under the terms of the PPA,
considering that by such action, TermoRfo's interests were
affected.
3. Lack of Registration of the PPA
The respondent claimed that the fact that neither Elec-
tranta nor TermoRio registered the PPA prevented obligations
from arising out of the contract. 242 He also added that the lack
of registration made the agreement nonexistent; therefore, no
breach of contract occurred under its terms because the obliga-
tions contained therein never arose.
243
237 See id.
238 See id.
239 See id.
240 See TermoRio S.A. E.S.P.
241 Id.
242 Id.
243 Id.
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When analyzing this ground, the arbitration tribunal mani-
fested its awareness of the need to register the PPA, considering
that if the parties did otherwise, the main obligations of the
PPA, such as the supply of power, the fixation of the price and
the payment could not be performed.244 The arbitration tribu-
nal also stated that the obligation to register the PPA was mu-
tually shared by both of the parties. 245 Contrary to what
Electranta claimed, the registration was not a requirement for
the existence of the PPA.
In its decision, the arbitration tribunal recognized that
there was evidence in the record showing that in several occa-
sions TermoRfo made its best efforts to comply with its obliga-
tions. According to the arbitration tribunal, TermoRfo acted
reasonably and diligently by proposing alternatives for the ful-
fillment of their obligations under the PPA and also drafted
amendments to the PPA.246 It was also clear to the arbitration
tribunal that, as opposed to its counterparty's efforts, Elec-
tranta's representatives did not do anything to overcome the
difficulties in complying with the obligation of the registration
of the PPA, and that Electranta should be liable for such
omission.247
Considering the above-referenced arguments, and after an-
alyzing the relief requested by TermoRfo, the arbitration tribu-
nal awarded TermoRfo with an amount close to U.S. $62
million, including damages and expenses.248
D. Judicial Review of the Award
As per the compilation of facts contained in the Council of
State's decision,249 within five days after the arbitration award
was issued, Electranta brought a claim before the Tribunal of
the District of Barranquilla requesting an annulment of the
award. Electranta argued that the arbitration agreement was
null and void under Sections 1 and 4 of Article 163 of Decree
244 See TermoRto S.A. E.S.P.
245 Id.
246 Id.
247 Id.
248 Id.
249 See Council of State, supra note 6.
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1818 of 1998.250 By means of a later brief, Electranta verified
that the proper competence to solve the issue was in the Council
of State pursuant to Article 36 of Law 446 of 1998,251 and so it
moved the claim to the latter tribunal.
1. Competence of the Council of State
When reviewing the grounds Electranta based the annul-
ment on, the Council of State concluded 252 that it was the com-
petent authority to review this request for annulment because
the PPA involved two entities that provide public utilities, and
one of them was a state-owned company. 253 It was also compe-
tent because the nature of the PPA was related to activities and
services usually rendered and regulated by the state.254 Ac-
cording to the Council of State, by assuming its competence to
review the present case, it was setting a precedent in order to
maintain certain uniformity as to the proper jurisdiction that
should resolve disputes whenever a state-owned entity is
involved.255
With regard to the argument to declare the arbitration
clause null and void, the Council of State held that Electranta
cited the wrong legal framework to request a review of the
award. 256 According to the Council of State, the proper grounds
for annulment are those contained in Article 72 of the Law of
Administrative Contracts. 257 Notwithstanding that fact, such
article does not provide that an arbitration clause is null and
void as a ground for annulment of an award. Despite this limi-
tation, the Council of State assumed the review of the arbitra-
250 This article sets forth the reasons to declare an award null and void. The
reasons stated on behalf of Electranta were: (i) invalidity of the arbitration clause,
and (ii) failure to practice evidence as requested by the parties, when such evi-
dence would have been determinant in the outcome of the dispute. Article 163 of
Decree 1818 of 1998 by which the statute of alternative dispute resolution mecha-
nisms is set forth.
251 This article modified some of the powers of the Council of State, and added
the power to decide the annulment of arbitration awards that arise from agree-
ments governed by the law of administrative contracts.
252 See Council of State, supra note 6.
253 See id.
254 See id.
255 See id.
256 Id.
257 These contracts are those that involve: (i) governmental entities, (ii) state-
owned entities or (iii) public utilities.
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tion clause was based solely on the general powers granted to it
under the administrative code. 258
In short, the Council of State manifested that its duty is to
declare an agreement null and void in cases where such circum-
stance is fully proven. 259 Therefore, the Council of State ex-
tended the applicability of one of its general powers to review
the arbitration award at hand and disregarded the application
of the grounds stated in the arbitration regulations. 260 Conse-
quently, the Council of State proceeded to review the validity of
the arbitration clause, with the purpose of defending public in-
terest pursuant to its general powers, as explained above. 261
The Council of State recognized that, in general terms, the
arbitration clause was created by consent.262 It admitted that it
existed from the moment the parties to the clause were willing
to submit their controversies to a tribunal and not to a judge. 263
It also recognized that it was a separate and autonomous clause
from the main agreement to which the arbitration clause was
attached.264 Lastly, it recognized that the grounds to annul an
arbitration award must be focused on the procedure and not on
the substance of the dispute.265 However, it again accepted as
an exception to the arbitration regime the possibility of its in-
tervention as judicial authority when there was enough evi-
dence to state that an arbitration agreement was null and
void.266
2. Applicable Law to the Arbitration Clause and
Arbitration Tribunal and Lack of Consent
The Council of State confirmed in its decision that there
was no evidence to prove that in executing the arbitration
clause, the parties wanted international arbitration, as was
mandated under Article 1 of Law 315 of 1996.267 According to
258 See Council of State, supra note 6.
259 Id.
260 Id.
261 See Council of State, supra note 6.
262 Id.
263 Id.
264 Id.
265 Id.
266 Id.
267 Id.
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the Council of State, the arbitration lacked the character of in-
ternationality because the parties did not expressly state so in
the clause.268 In the Council of State's words, such lack of evi-
dence made the clause null and void.269
The Council of State further explained that institutional
arbitration was restricted to cases of international arbitra-
tions. 270 On the contrary, institutional arbitration was not al-
lowed in cases of domestic arbitrations such as the one chosen
by TermoRio and Electranta. In addition, and referring to the
ICC, the Council of State held that it is contrary to the laws of
the Republic of Colombia to submit a dispute to a different ju-
risdiction from the one recognized under national laws.271
Based on the above reasoning, the Council of State declared the
arbitration clause null and void and annulled the arbitration
award.
Under the hypothetical that the investment of U.S. com-
pany Sithe Energies in TermoRfo would have been insured by
either OPIC or MIGA under a breach of contract coverage, the
decision of the Council of State would have prevented the inves-
tor from claiming the insurance because the award was an-
nulled by a court from the place where the arbitration award
was rendered, taking away its effects and making it
unenforceable.
From the reasoning of the Council of State, it is clear that
due to the lack of clarity in the interpretation of the law, and
due to the overreaching powers assumed by the Council of
State, a decision affecting foreign investment, and hence inter-
national trade, was made. This situation reveals the political
risk of judicial override, as will be explained in further detail
below.
The following are the special features of the mentioned new
risk, which are shown throughout the reasoning contained in
the decision issued by the Council of State, dated August 5,
2002.272
268 See Council of State, supra note 6.
269 Id.
270 Id.
271 Id.
272 See Council of State, supra note 6.
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E. Special Features of New Risk
1. Grounds to Set Aside the Awards
The fact that the Council of State annulled the award on
the ground that is neither provided under the applicable arbi-
tration law, nor provided by the Law of Administrative Con-
tracts, creates the question of what the limit for judicial
intervention on the review of arbitration awards must be. Addi-
tionally, it reveals the uncertainty of not knowing the outcome
of an arbitration proceeding considering that all the available
grounds to set aside awards are not clear under the applicable
arbitration law.
2. Lack of Internationality of Transaction and
Arbitration Procedure
The international character of the transaction and of the
arbitration was totally omitted by the Council of State, leaving
the investor and its subsidiary unprotected and without any
means to claim its rights on validly legal grounds. Going back
to the requirements set forth in Article 1 of Law 315 of 1996, the
Council of State not only disregarded the validity of the agree-
ment between the parties and their consent, but it also disre-
garded the fact that the transaction involved international
trade (as there was foreign investment through equity in one of
the companies that participated in the transaction).
In some sense, and pursuant to Article 1 of the New York
Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Ar-
bitral Awards, the Council of State was not bound to apply this
regime. This article states that the convention applies to:
[T]he recognition and enforcement of arbitral awards made in the
territory of a State other than the State where the recognition and
enforcement of such awards are sought (... ). It shall also apply to
arbitral awards not considered as domestic awards in the State
where their recognition and enforcement are sought. 273
Since the dispute among TermoRfo and Electranta was con-
sidered a domestic dispute rather than an international one, the
273 Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral
Awards - the "New York" Convention art. 1, Jun. 10 1958, 21 U.S.T. 2517, availa-
ble at http://www.uncitral.org/en/uncitraltexts/arbitration/NYConvention.html.
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New York Convention could not be applied to the case. Also, in
general, this fact implies a clear political risk for the parties
involved in arbitration, not only because the consensual nature
of the arbitration was ignored, but also because the decision of
the Council of State ignored that foreign capital was involved in
the transaction and that more interests besides national ones
were intermingled in the dispute.
3. Authority of the Parties to go to Arbitration and
Setting Rules
The Council of State ignores the fact that arbitration is a
product of the parties' consent. It ties their consent to the tech-
nicalities of the applicable laws and not to the autonomy of the
parties involved by declaring that the arbitration clause is null
and void. Even when the enforceability of the arbitration clause
was possible, (provided that the arbitration regime had an ex-
press provision on such regard and that the applicable law of
contracts for stated-owned entities also allows them to settle
their disputes through arbitration),274 it was not clear under
the applicable law whether parties were entirely free to choose
the applicable rules of procedure. As stated above, unless the
arbitration was international,27 5 parties were able to choose
applicable procedural rules. In the case at hand, the parties
probably assumed that this transaction could meet the require-
ments of an international arbitration. However, in the interest
of Electranta as the state-owned entity, such information was
omitted. In the end, the intervention of the judicial entity
erased any effort by the parties to maintain the disputes far
from the national courts, which is also a manifest political risk
for foreign investors, given the uncertainty in the outcome of an
arbitration procedure chosen by both parties.
When analyzing the conduct of the Council of State, it could
be said that its decision amounts to a denial of justice to the
274 See Law 80 of 1993, arts. 13 and 70.
275 See Law 315 Diario Oficial 42878, art. 2 (Sept. 1996) (Colom.), supra note
198 (stating that parties to an international arbitration agreement may choose
both the governing law and the rules of procedure applicable to a particular dis-
pute. Article 1 of the same law states that for an arbitration to be international,
parties must agree on such character. The article also states several conditions
related to the character of the dispute, and includes as a condition that the dispute
must affect international commercial interests).
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investor under a broad interpretation of such principle. Follow-
ing that thought, the misapplication of the Colombian arbitra-
tion rules by the Council of State, which is openly contrary to
international practice, could be taken by some as a mere error,
thus not covered under the denial of justice principle. 276 Yet,
the manifest disregard of the arbitration regime and the con-
sent of the parties could be used by the investor as grounds to
allege the breach of such principle in order to demand from the
insurer the payment of the breach of contract coverage.
In spite of this reasoning, the TermoRfo case does not fall
under the provision contained in the political risk insurance
contract as it exists today. To make a breach of contract cover-
age suitable for a situation similar to the TermoRfo case, it
would be required to modify the scope of the coverage or to ap-
ply a broader interpretation of the principle of denial of justice.
V. PROPOSALS
Under the Colombian arbitration regime, if parties to an
agreement decide to opt for an international arbitration, the
clause must comply with the special requirements contained in
the regime in order to be valid and enforceable.2 7 As a propo-
sal, the following is a draft which, in principle, complies with
the legal requirements. This draft is based on the ICC standard
arbitration clause.
Arbitration clause: Pursuant to Article 1 of the Law 315 of
1996, the parties expressly agree to resolve their disputes through
the mechanism of international arbitration, considering the inter-
national commercial interests involved in the dispute. Thus, all
disputes arising out or in connection with the present contract
shall be finally settled under the Rules of Arbitration of the Inter-
national Chamber of Commerce by one or more arbitrators ap-
pointed in accordance with said rules.
Despite the proposed clause, and keeping in mind the risk
identified in the decision of the Council of State, two proposals
should be made on both national and international levels. Such
proposals will help to avoid uncertainties as to the outcome of
consented arbitration when carried out in Colombia, and will
276 See MIGA INVESTMENT GUIDE, supra note 3, at 261.
277 See Law 315 of 1996, art. 1.
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leave an open door to insurers to enhance their coverage as to
political risk and promote flexibility in the interpretation of the
existing conditions of the coverage.
A. National Level: Amendments to Existing Legislation
Despite the amount of arbitration procedures that are be-
ing held in Colombian territory, the TermoRio decision revealed
some gaps in the national legislation that should be filled in or-
der to prevent the occurrence of similar situations. In this
sense, it is necessary to provide a clearer regulation and to pro-
mote a consequent interpretation regarding the following issues:
1. International Arbitration
When we are facing an international arbitration, how can
parties evidence such character in the arbitration clause? Al-
though Law 315 of 1996 recognizes the existence and validity of
international arbitration, the interpretation of the law has not
been clear as to whether the arbitration clause should contain
the word "international" or if the fact that the underlying trans-
action involves international commerce (by means of the partic-
ipation of foreign capital), implies the possibility of opting for
such arbitration. The latter seems to be the most logical and
sensitive way to interpret the legal mandate, following the
trends adopted in the international arena .2 7  In such sense,
and in case the particular agreement involves one foreigner who
acts as an investor, the international arbitration regulation
should be applied. That way it would be easier for both parties
to predict the outcome of the dispute resolution procedure cho-
sen by them via agreement and to have the certainty that their
agreement will be respected and enforced.
278 In this sense, Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506 (1974), is a
landmark decision of a U.S. court that evaluates the internationality of a dispute.
It states that such characteristic must be reviewed in light of the needs of interna-
tional commerce and its protection, as well as of the protection and the wellness of
international relations. Such doctrine was adopted within the U.S. ever since, and
has helped to set the grounds in the international arena for the analysis of the
internationality of a dispute. The Colombian Constitutional Court, in the decision
C-347 of 1997, indicated that the parties to an agreement to arbitrate should be
free to opt for an international arbitration procedure, as long as one of the parties
is foreign. But, even under this interpretation, a company that is incorporated in
Colombia with foreign capital will not fulfill the requirement stated by the court.
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2. Party Autonomy to Choose Procedural Rules
When can the parties to an arbitration clause choose their
arbitration rules? This issue is tied to the issue reviewed above.
Currently, if the arbitration is international, parties are al-
lowed to choose the rules of their preference. On the other
hand, if the arbitration is domestic, as was assumed by the
Council of State in the TermoRfo case, the procedural law appli-
cable in Colombia cannot be substituted unless the rules chosen
by the parties are those of a recognized institution that operates
in Colombia. Again, in a case in which foreign capital is in-
volved, it is obvious that parties should be free to choose neutral
rules that fit best in the context of international commerce.
3. Grounds to Review Awards
What are the grounds under which a local court can review
an award and consequently set it aside? This seems to be the
issue that requires the most thorough and sensitive review.
When reviewing the decision of the Council of State, and with-
out regard as to whether the arbitration was international or
national, the legal grounds to set aside the award were not
taken into account while other grounds were applied. This dan-
gerous situation could be repeated in the future unless an effort
to unify the grounds to annul awards and provide a clarification
in their interpretation in this area of the law is implemented.
B. International Level: Enhanced Coverage of Political Risk
Insurance
Considering that a situation such as the one present in the
TermoRio case is not foreseen as a risk by either OPIC or
MIGA, it would be advisable to modify the current scope of
breach of contract coverage, allowing investors to make a claim
as long as they can prove there has been a denial of justice on
behalf of local courts or arbitral awards, and not until after en-
forcement is sought.
The TermoRfo case revisits some of the situations that are
most feared by investors, such as delays in the procedure, un-
predictability in the outcome of an arbitration dispute, and the
fact that the award can be subject to annulment by local courts
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before the investor attempts to enforce it.279 Under the perspec-
tive of the TermoRfo case, the only way the investor could make
a claim under the breach of contract coverage would be by start-
ing a new domestic judicial procedure in order to request the
declaration of breach of contract. This would make the process
much more burdensome for the investor and disregards his in-
terest in settling disputes away from the local courts.
By means of an enhanced coverage, both MIGA and OPIC
could provide investors with the possibility of making a claim
once an arbitration comes to an end justified under the princi-
ple of denial of justice. Through such process, investors can
avoid delays arising from intentions by the host country to ap-
peal the arbitration tribunal's decision, and investors will be
given some degree of certainty as to the possibility of obtaining
the amounts insured once a dispute resolution mechanism has
come to an end.
VI. CONCLUSION
The efforts of governmental entities and legislators to im-
prove the foreign investment conditions in developing countries
are not sufficient if investors cannot manage and allocate com-
mercial and political risks properly, even with the help of inter-
national entities that provide insurance. In this sense, synergy
must exist among the domestic applicable legislation to the for-
eign investment, from corporate laws to alternative dispute res-
olution mechanisms and arbitration. Needless to say, the risks
covered by the insurers must mirror current market needs in
order to satisfy the requirements of the investors in the interna-
tional arena. Otherwise, we will be facing the same problems
and gaps of the TermoRfo decision, nurturing uncertainties re-
lated to foreign investment in developing countries and denying
the possibility for such countries to grow with the help of for-
eign capital.
279 See Moran, supra note 7, at 52.
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